The Economics -- Conventional, Behavioral, and Political -- of  Subsequent Remedial Measures  Evidence by Kahan, Dan M
ESSAY 
THE ECONOMICS?CONVENTIONAL, BEHAVIORAL, 
AND POLITICAL?OF "SUBSEQUENT 
REMEDIAL MEASURES" EVIDENCE 
Dan M. Kahan* 
Economic analyses of evidence law have proliferated in recent years. 
This paper criticizes the economic justifications that have been advanced on 
behalf of one rule in particular: the ban on proof of "subsequent remedial 
measures" (SRM) to suggest inadequate precautions were taken before an 
accident. The conventional economic defense of this rule?that allowing 
SRM proofs discourages parties from taking steps ex post to prevent recur 
rence of accidents?ignores the negative effect that banning SRM evidence 
has on incentives to take care ex ante. The behavioral economic rationale? 
that factfinders will overvalue SRM proofs because of "hindsight bias 
"? 
fails to weigh the risk of erroneous imposition of liability when such evidence 
is admitted against the risk of erroneous nonimposition of liability when it is 
excluded. Rather than a categorical ban, economic analysis supports a case 
by-case evaluation of whether SRM proofs should be admitted in light of the 
strength of the remaining evidence in the case. The uneven enforcement of 
the SRM ban often noted by commentators can in fact be defended on these 
grounds. The scholarly defense of a categorical ban, this Essay concludes, 
reflects a decidedly unempi?cal (and necessarily conservative) style of eco 
nomic analysis that seeks to win assent by showing that it can rationalize 
existing legal rules. This form of law and economics is singularly unsuited 
for the analysis of evidence because it exacerbates the tendency of undesirable 
rules of proof to perpetuate themselves through the effect they have in shaping 
popular beliefs about hoiv the world works. 
Introduction 
Just over a decade ago, Professor Richard Friedman wrote an article 
puzzling over why the "law and economics movement," despite its "major 
impact on many areas of law," had had so "little on the law of evidence."1 
In the years since, Friedman's "hope that . . . more legal economists . . . 
[would] find evidentiary issues worthy of exploration"2 has been amply 
fulfilled. The field of evidence has grown into a bustling colony within 
* Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Thanks to Michael Green, 
Richard Posner, Jeff Rachlinski, and Maggie Wittlin for comments on an earlier draft. 
1. Richard D. Friedman, Economic Analysis of Evidentiary Law: An Underused Tool, 
an Underplowed Field, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1531, 1531 (1998). 
2. Id. at 1538. 
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the "L&E" empire, densely populated with communities of both conven 
tional and behavioral legal economists.3 
My object in this Essay is to offer a critical assessment of one evi 
dence rule that L&E is commonly understood to justify. That rule cate 
gorically bars so-called "subsequent remedial measure" (SRM) proofs? 
evidence of action taken to prevent recurrence of an accident, offered to 
support the inference that the defendant could have and should have 
taken such action before the plaintiff suffered injury.4 By eliminating the 
prospect that steps to reduce future accidents will be used to prove liabil 
ity for past conduct, the SRM rule, according to conventional law and 
economics (CLEC), removes a disincentive to behavior that promotes so 
cial wealth.5 Behavioral law and economics (BLEC) buttresses the case 
for the rule by adding that it prevents the factfinder from indulging 
"hindsight bias": Once the factfinder learns that a party adopted a partic 
ular remedial measure ex post, it will be psychologically impelled to over 
estimate how readily the utility of such a measure could have been pre 
dicted ex ante.6 Although developed more systematically through 
3. Richard Posner quickly accepted Friedman's invitation, issuing a broad-ranging 
theoretical survey of diverse evidence doctrines and issues. See generally Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477 (1999) 
[hereinafter Posner, Economic Approach] (offering comprehensive economic analysis of 
evidence law and concluding that "the institutional and doctrinal structure of the 
American law of evidence has a subtle . . . economic logic"). For additional conventional 
economic analyses, see, e.g., Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law xii, 141-72 (2005) 
(providing economic analysis of "evidential rules and doctrines" on assumption that 
"[a]djudicative fact-finding needs to be cost-efficient"). See generally 2 Economics of 
Evidence, Procedure and Litigation (Chris William Sanchirico ed., 2007) (applying 
economic theories such as "game theory, information economics and mechanism design" 
to "the study of legal fact finding"); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the 
Object of Trial, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1227 (2001) (focusing on "trial's role in the provision 
of incentives" by which "sanctions and rewards" are "connected appropriately" to an 
"individual's actual behavior"). For behavioral law and economic accounts, see generally 
Craig R. Callen, Othello Could Not Optimize: Economics, Hearsay, and Less Adversary 
Systems, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1791 (2001) ("[M]odels of fact finding in less adversary 
systems that incorporate cognitive science may more easily explain the persistence of . . . 
exclusionary rules or decision rules ... in such systems."); Russell B. Korobkin 8c Thomas 
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051 (2000) (arguing law "has real effects on private behavior" 
and "[l]aw and economics is, at root, a behavioral theory"). For an early (and engaging) 
application of law and economics to evidence?one predating Friedman's call?see 
generally Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1786 
(1980). Earlier still is Bentham's classic five-volume treatise, which applies a (highly 
critical) utilitarian mode of analysis to rules of proof generally. Jeremy Bentham, 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice (London, Hunt 8c 
Clarke 1827). For a criticism of the new evidence scholarship?and particularly of 
Posner?see generally Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: 
Common Sense on Stilts, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1619 (2001). 
4. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 407. 
5. See, e.g., Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 3, at 1485. 
6. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 
65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 617-18 (1998) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Psychological Theory] 
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contemporary L&E frameworks, these rationales are among the ones that 
have been offered to justify the rule since its inception at common law.7 
My argument is that the economic justifications for the SRM rule are 
uncompelling. Neither CLEC nor BLEC convincingly justifies categorical 
exclusion of SRM proofs. Indeed, properly applied, both theories furnish 
compelling support for admitting such evidence, conditional on highly 
particular, fact-specific balancing of the sort that courts use to determine 
admissibility of evidence generally. Those conditioned (through 
Pavlovian stimuli, including the approving nod of professors and the 
ready acceptance of law review articles) to believe the law is "efficient" 
might be tempted to view the near-universality of the rule as cause to 
discount the substance of my critique of the economic justifications for 
the SRM rule. So, for good measure, I will reinforce the argument with 
an account of the political economy of evidence lawmaking that explains 
why we should expect the SRM rule to persist?particularly in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence?despite any adverse effect on social wealth. 
My motivations are several. One is to justify a narrow application 
(or, more candidly, a simple evasion) of the SRM rule. Like other cate 
gorical exclusion rules,8 the bar on SRM proofs turns on the application 
of analytically complex?or just plain ambiguous?criteria defining the 
type of evidence to which it applies and the purposes for which such evi 
dence can and cannot be used. Judges predictably negotiate these com 
plexities by considering whether application of the rule to the case at 
hand would advance the rationales of the rule.9 Consequently, in the 
course of its application, the SRM rule tends to transmute from a categor 
ical bar into exactly the sort of fact-specific assessment that the rule is 
meant to supplant. Commentators usually criticize this tendency;10 I em 
brace it. Because my own economic analysis of the SRM rule shows why it 
would be a mistake to apply it categorically, this Essay defends an ap 
proach to applying it that renders the rule noncategorical. 
Another and more basic objective is to raise a note of caution about 
a recurring bias in the economic analysis of evidence, and indeed in eco 
nomic analysis more generally. Although such analyses take the form of 
("[Courts] worry that juries will mistakenly assume that because the world gets wiser as it 
gets older, therefore it was foolish before." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
7. See Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee's note (identifying these as rationales for 
rule at common law). 
8. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404, 408-11. 
9. See generally Jack B. Weinstein 8c Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 
Manual: A Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence Based on Weinstein's Federal Evidence 
? 7.04[4][a], [c], [f] (2004) (counseling reliance on rule's policy rationales to ensure 
distinction between impermissible substandard-conduct proofs and permissible 
"impeachment" and "feasibility" proofs). 
10. See, e.g., 23 Charles Alan Wright 8c Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and 
Procedure ?? 5282, 5288-5289 (1980 8c Supp. 2009) (discussing "obvious threat to the 
integrity ... of the general exclusionary rule" when SRM proofs deemed admissible under 
various exceptions to Rule 407 ban, such as to prove feasibility or impeach witness). 
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normative evaluations of particular rules, their primary aim is to demon 
strate the plausibility of economic frameworks generally?often in the 
face of skepticism by noneconomic theorists?by showing that these 
frameworks cogently explain why these rules have the content that they 
do. Because the rhetorical force of this strategy depends on demonstrat 
ing an agreement between economic analysis and existing doctrine, those 
who use it tend to avoid drawing attention to contentious empirical prem 
ises relating to the actual welfare effects of the rules they are defending.11 
This characteristic of L&E theorizing is troubling no matter where it oc 
curs. But I believe it is distinctively problematic when applied to the law 
of evidence. Evidence law by its nature exerts tremendous power over 
collective understandings of how the world works.12 It is therefore espe 
cially vital that scholarly analysts of evidence law probe it with methods 
that reflect appropriate critical distance and skepticism.13 
My argument unfolds in four parts. Part I presents an overview of 
the SRM rule and its standard CLEC and BLEC justifications. Parts II and 
III critique these justifications. Lastly, Part IV critiques the political econ 
omy of the rule. 
I. The SRM Rule: Law and Theory 
A person loses control of an electric saw that severs his finger, and he 
sues the manufacturer for failing to equip the saw with a guard that he 
alleges would have prevented his injury. At trial, he seeks to introduce 
evidence that, after the accident, the manufacturer redesigned the saw to 
include such a guard.14 The SRM rule will determine admissibility of this 
proof, which I will use as a running example to illustrate how the rule 
works and what it is thought to accomplish. 
To make sense of the rule, it helps to start with the regime that it 
modifies. The key concepts in this regime are relevance and prejudice. 
11. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law 8c Economics, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 
815, 822-25 (1990) ("[V]ery little in . . . most . . . writing on law 8c economics[ ] could be 
described as a rigorous attempt to falsify alternative explanations for a given 
phenomenon."). 
12. See generally Michael J. Saks 8c Robert F. Kidd, Human Information-Processing 
and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 Law 8c Soc'y Rev. 123 (1981) (highlighting that 
"[m]ost legal decision making ... is done under conditions of uncertainty" and pointing to 
"the effect of [a] trial's format on the fact finder's subjective certainty of guilt"). 
13. This is the mission, in fact, that legal scholars have been exhorted to fulfill by the 
recent National Academy of Sciences report detailing the large number of scandalous 
deficiencies in forensic science that have become entrenched because of the long judicial 
acceptance of them. See Nat'l Research Council of the Nat'l Acads., Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 85-111 (2009) (describing "the 
legal system's reliance on forensic science evidence in criminal prosecutions and 
. . . the 
existing adversarial process for admitting this type of evidence"). This Essay is meant as a 
contribution to this urgent effort and is offered in a spirit of gratitude toward, and 
admiration of, the Report's courageous authors. 
14. This fact pattern has arisen in actual product liability cases. See, e.g., Ross v. Black 
8c Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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Under the modern approach?reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 
401?evidence is deemed relevant if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be [judged to be] 
without the evidence."15 This standard sets a deliberately low threshold. 
To be relevant, a piece of evidence certainly does not, on its own, have to 
demonstrate that a legally consequential fact (or its negation) is more 
probable than not; it need only change the factfinder's assessment of the 
likelihood of that fact to some detectable extent.16 
Evidence that satisfies this relatively low threshold can still be ex 
cluded, however, if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice."17 Prejudice refers to the tendency of evi 
dence to induce decision on some "improper basis."18 Improper bases 
for decision typically include some form of bias, emotional or cognitive.19 
But prejudice is understood broadly enough to encompass pretty much 
any undesirable consequence associated with admissibility?including 
disregard for some important societal interest or value, or a simple waste 
of time or other inconvenience.20 
Ordinarily, as reflected in Rule 403, courts attempt a comparative 
weighing of probity and prejudice when considering admissibility.21 
However, a set of rules?of which the SRM rule is one?singles out entire 
categories of evidence for per se exclusion. While not completely devoid 
of relevance, the types of proof specified by the categorical exclusion 
rules are understood to involve such low degrees of likely probative value 
15. Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
16. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee's note (explaining rule is meant to set 
forth liberal standard?"a brick is not a wall"?and to dispel any "confusion between 
questions of admissibility and questions of the sufficiency of the evidence" (quoting 
McCormick on Evidence 641 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) ) ). 
17. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
18. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note. 
19. Id.; Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of 
Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 497, 503-10 (1983) (discussing prejudice 
resulting from emotion and arguing prejudice becomes unfair when it causes factfinder to 
commit "inferential error"). 
20. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and 
Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the 
Common Law of Evidence?, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 879, 893-907 (1988) (identifying potential 
legal authority supporting use of Rule 403 to secure values extrinsic to truthseeking and 
efficient administration of litigation, and arguing against such use); J. Alexander Tanford, 
A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 Ind. LJ. 831, 855 (1989) 
(discussing academic commentary that identifies "political dimension[s] to the prejudice 
rule" in terms of equating prejudice with undermining state's political interests). 
21. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). 
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and such high degrees of likely prejudice that case-specific balancing can 
efficiently be dispensed with.22 
The categorical exclusion rules have a signature form. First, each 
contains a definitional element, which identifies the type of evidence sub 
ject to the rule. Second, each has a forbidden-purpose element that spec 
ifies the inference or set of inferences that such evidence is not admissi 
ble to establish; evidence that comes within the definitional element can 
be introduced for other purposes subject to the usual case-specific, Rule 
403 balancing of probity and prejudice. For example, the ban on "char 
acter propensity" proofs (Rule 404) prohibits evidence of a disposition or 
"trait of character" offered to support the inference that a person be 
haved "in conformity" with his or her character "on a particular occa 
sion."23 Character propensity proofs are understood to invite indulgence 
of unreliable assumptions about the strength of individuals' behavioral 
tendencies and also to denigrate ideals of free will and individual self 
determination.24 However, the bar on character propensity proofs does 
not prohibit evidence indicative of a person's character when offered for 
"other purposes, such as proof of. . . knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake."25 
The SRM rule fits this pattern. As reflected in Federal Rule of Evi 
dence 407 (a typical categorical rule formulation adopted verbatim in 
many states), the definitional element makes the rule applicable to "mea 
sures" implemented "after an injury or harm" that "would have made the 
injury or harm less likely to occur" if "taken previously."26 Rule 407 for 
bids introducing this evidence "to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a 
defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warn 
ing or instruction."27 In the case of the individual injured while using the 
electric saw, for example, the rule would prohibit introduction of the 
22. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee's note (stating "Rule 404 and those 
following it" govern "situations [that] recur with sufficient frequency to create patterns 
susceptible of treatment by specific rules" reflecting "application of [Rule 401] as limited 
by the exclusionary principles of Rule 403"); Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note 
(describing Rules 404 and 407-411 as "concrete applications" of "the policies underlying" 
Rule 403 to "particular situations" that admit of "specific rules"). 
23. Fed. R. Evid. 404. 
24. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("The inquiry is 
not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much 
with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general 
record . . . ." (footnote omitted)); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a 
Criminal, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 920, 936 (1987) ("To infer that a defendant committed the 
particular offense for which he is being tried from the fact that he has previously 
committed other crimes of a generally similar nature?or, worse still, other crimes of an 
entirely different nature?is not only unfair, but inconsistent with a fundamental 
supposition that criminal behavior is punishable because it represents a free choice at a 
particular moment in time to commit an immoral act."). 
25. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 
26. Fed. R. Evid. 407. 
27. Id. 
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postaccident installation of a guard to support the inference that the fail 
ure to equip the saw with a guard at the outset was negligent or rendered 
the saw unreasonably dangerous. But such evidence could be introduced 
for "another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of 
precautionary measures if controverted, or impeachment."28 
Like the other categorical exclusion rules, the SRM ban reflects a 
determination that the prejudice associated with such evidence is highly 
likely to outweigh whatever probative value it might have. The Advisory 
Committee for Rule 407 explains: 
The rule rests on two grounds. (1) The conduct is not in fact an 
admission, since the conduct is equally consistent with injury by 
mere accident or through contributory negligence. Or, as 
Baron Bramwell put it, the rule rejects the notion that "because 
the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish 
before." Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R.N.S. 
261, 263 (1869). Under a liberal theory of relevancy this 
ground alone would not support exclusion, as the inference is 
still a possible one. (2) The other, and more impressive, ground 
for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to 
take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in fur 
therance of added safety.29 
The two sorts of prejudice the Advisory Committee Notes associate with 
Rule 407 can be readily translated into economic rationales for excluding 
SRM proofs. The ground the Committee identifies as "more impressive" 
is easily understood in CLEC terms. If a party fears a factfinder will treat 
an SRM proof as evidence that such measures could and should have 
been adopted before the accident, fear of enhanced liability could deter 
that party from taking socially desirable precautions to prevent such acci 
dents from recurring (such as equipping the dangerous saw with a guard, 
in the example). From this perspective, it makes sense to categorically 
exclude such evidence, because the contribution SRM evidence makes to 
the accurate determination of facts in the courtroom will always (or 
nearly always) be offset by the distorting effect its anticipated admission 
would have on behavior outside of it.30 
The rationale that the Advisory Committee views as the weaker one 
for the SRM rule?Baron Bramwell's concern that the wisdom of experi 
ence will be treated as evidence of prior foolishness?grows stronger 
when fortified with insights from BLEC. The Advisory Committee's skep 
ticism about this rationale would be fully warranted if one understood 
that position as asserting only that SRM proofs are by their nature irrele 
28. Id.; see also Ross v. Black Sc Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (7th Cir. 1992) 
("[U]nder Rule 407, post-manufacture remedial measures are admissible if the 
manufacturer disputes the feasibility of the remedial measures."). 
29. Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee's note. 
30. See, e.g., Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 3, at 1485 ("The primary 
concern is that the admissibility of such evidence would, by discouraging repairs, increase 
the risk of future accidents."). 
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vant?a position courts sometimes advance.31 A party who correctly 
judged the prospect of a serious accident to be, and to remain, remote 
would have little economic incentive to adopt a remedial measure even 
after such an event occurred. A party would also have little reason to 
adopt such a measure if it had correctly determined before the accident 
that such a measure would be ineffective in averting it. The subsequent 
adoption of a precaution, then, furnishes a rational factfinder with rea 
sons to assume that the party adopting the precaution knew such mea 
sures were warranted ex ante. That effect is enough to get an SRM proof 
over the low threshold set by Rule 401, even if it does not by itself prove 
the party behaved in a substandard manner by failing to adopt the mea 
sure earlier.32 
But BLEC tells us that a real-world factfinder is unlikely to give SRM 
proofs an effect this limited. "Hindsight bias" refers to the tendency of 
individuals to form an exaggerated assessment of how easily some contin 
gency (a surprise attack by an invading army, say) could have been pre 
dicted once they learn it actually occurred.33 In the setting of SRM 
proofs, then, a factfinder who learns a party responded to an accident by 
adopting precautions against recurrence (e.g., adding a guard to the de 
sign of the electric saw) will overestimate how readily the utility of that 
measure could have been gauged before the accident. It is true the SRM 
proof supplies the factfinder with reasons to revise downward its assess 
ment of the likelihood of two exculpating scenarios: that the probability 
of the accident was and remains trivially remote, and that a precaution 
would not have helped anyway. But as a result of hindsight bias, the 
factfinder could well be lulled into downgrading the likelihood of multi 
ple other exculpating scenarios consistent with ex post adoption of the 
measure. Such exculpating scenarios include, for example, the accident 
itself furnishing critical, previously inaccessible information about the 
probability or magnitude of possible accidents; postaccident circum 
stances reducing the cost or increasing the effectiveness of the precaution 
enough to tip the balance in favor of its implementation; or even the 
31. See, e.g., Columbia 8c Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892) 
("[S]uch acts afford no legitimate basis for construing such an act as an admission of 
previous neglect of duty. A person may have exercised all the care which the law required, 
and yet, in the light of his new experience, after an unexpected accident has occurred, and 
as a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt additional safeguards." (quoting Morse v. 
Minneapolis 8c St. L. Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883))); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. 
v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[C]hanges in design 
. . . might be 
made after an accident for a number of different reasons: simply to avoid another injury, 
as a sort of admission of error, because a better way has been discovered, or to implement 
an idea or plan conceived before the accident"). 
32. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee's note ("The standard of 
probability under the rule 
. . . has the added virtue of avoiding confusion between 
questions of admissibility and questions of the sufficiency of the evidence."). 
33. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge 
on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. Experimental Psychol. 288, 288, 297-98 (1975) 
(studying effects of hindsight knowledge on judges' probabilistic beliefs of 
case outcomes). 
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experience of the accident instilling in the party a supererogatory motiva 
tion to adopt a precaution that the law would impose no duty to imple 
ment. BLEC posits that this distortion of judgment is so likely to out 
weigh any appropriate contribution SRM proofs make to accurate 
factfmding that the evidence should be excluded categorically.34 
Indeed, the adverse effect that hindsight bias has on factfmding can 
magnify the adverse effect it has on behavior. The more likely factfinders 
are to overvalue SRM proofs, the more likely parties are to refrain from 
adopting them out of fear of liability. If parties anticipated that 
factfinders would give such proofs only the weight they are correctly due, 
none would face any disincentive against adopting precautionary mea 
sures on the basis of genuine postaccident contingencies, including new 
information revealed by the accident itself.35 Enriched with the psycho 
logical sophistication of BLEC, Bramwell's concern?that factfinders will 
fallaciously infer that because someone learned from his mistake, he 
could have learned just as much without making it?is thus seen to be 
part of what gives the "more impressive" ground for the SRM rule its 
strength. 
Of course, only someone whose moral imagination has been fully 
occupied by the L&E worldview would think that CLEC and BLEC supply 
the sole conceivable understandings of the prejudice averted by the SRM 
rule. Presumably, a person who appropriately values others should be mo 
tivated to do whatever she reasonably can to prevent recurrence of an 
injurious accident; an individual who experiences such motivation de 
serves praise, or at least less condemnation, than someone who reacts to 
another's injury with cold indifference or even cold calculation. Putting 
someone who tries to make the world safer in more legal peril than some 
one who does not, then, seems to express a morally false account of the 
elements of good character?wholly apart from what we think the incen 
tives of such an outcome might be.36 The law's communication of this 
deficient message would be a form of prejudice akin to the denigration of 
the ideal of autonomy associated with admission of character propensity 
evidence. 
34. See Rachlinski, Psychological Theory, supra note 6, at 617-18 (noting courts have 
deemed SRM proofs inadmissible out of fear of hindsight bias impacting juries' liability 
determinations). 
35. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) 
("It is only because juries are believed to overreact to evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures that the admissibility of such evidence could deter defendants from taking such 
measures."); Rachlinski, Psychological Theory, supra note 6, at 617-18 (arguing if jury gave 
appropriate weight to evidence of remedial measures, "[defendants should . . . have no 
fear" of SRM proofs). 
36. See Hawthorne, 144 U.S. at 208 ("The more careful a person is . . . the more likely 
he would be to [engage in a remedial measure] .... [T]o have such acts construed as an 
admission of prior negligence . . . virtually holds out an inducement for continued 
negligence." (quoting Morse, 16 N.W. at 359)). 
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The rationales for the SRM ban are important because the terms of 
the rule are, at a minimum, analytically complex, if not incoherent. This 
is the case for all the categorical exclusion rules. Just as the courts must 
do with the other rules, then, they must construe the SRM ban's defini 
tional and forbidden-purpose elements in a manner that reflects a sensi 
ble understanding of when and how proffered evidence creates the forms 
of prejudice the rules are designed to deflect. 
For example, does the SRM bar apply to so-called "third party" reme 
dial measures?ones adopted after an accident by a nonparty who is in a 
position to take action to prevent recurrence of an accident? Imagine 
that the worker injured by the electric saw seeks to introduce evidence 
that, after the accident, the worker's own employer devised a guard to 
make the saw less dangerous. Presumably, or so the argument would go, 
if the employer was able to take remedial action afterwards, there is more 
reason to think the manufacturer could have done so before. Can the 
saw's manufacturer object to admission of this proof? After all, the em 
ployer presumably could have invoked Rule 407 had the injured worker 
sued her for negligently supplying her with dangerous equipment. The 
use of the passive voice in the text of Rule 407 leaves the status of such 
evidence unclear: "When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an 
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the 
injury or harm less likely to occur . . . ."37 Well, taken by whom? By the 
defendant and the defendant alone, courts have concluded. They reason 
that parties will be deterred from adopting postaccident precautions only 
by the prospect of their own actions being admitted against them38 Far 
from deterring precaution-taking, treating a precautionary response as 
admissible against parties other than the one who adopted it creates incen 
tives for every party in a position to implement such a measure?the man 
ufacturer and the employer, in the example?to be the first to do so.39 
This argument is sound if one focuses one's attention only on the CLEC 
rationale. It is also convincing under the noneconomic, expressive ratio 
nale, since admission of the third party's remedial measures puts it at no 
risk. Nevertheless, it seems to give short shrift to the Bramwellian BLEC 
rationale, since there is no reason to think factfinders will overestimate 
the foreseeable utility of a precautionary measure (here the equipment 
modification) based only on the defendant's, and not on a third party's, 
ex post adoption of it. 
37. Fed. R. Evid. 407 (emphasis added). 
38. See, e.g., Diehl v. Blaw-Knox, 360 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Th[e] policy 
[behind Rule 407] is not implicated where the evidence concerns remedial measures taken 
by [a non-party] ... to the lawsuit. The admission of [such evidence] necessarily will not 
expose that non-party to liability, and therefore will not discourage the non-party from 
taking the remedial measures in the first place."). 
39. See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(finding Rule 407's underlying social policy not furthered by inclusion of third-party 
repairs and affirming Rule 407's application only to measures taken by defendant). 
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The forbidden-purpose element creates even more pressure to ad 
vert to the animating purposes of the rule in construing its terms. In the 
example, the injured worker would not be permitted to present evidence 
of the manufacturer's modification of the saw to support the inference 
that the omission of a guard from the original design made the product 
unreasonably dangerous. But as soon as the manufacturer called a wit 
ness to testify that it was reasonable for the company to omit a guard from 
the design, the injured worker could proffer the subsequent redesign to 
show "feasibility," which the manufacturer's proof could be characterized 
as having "controverted."40 To the same effect, the plaintiff could simply 
ask the manufacturer's witness on cross-examination whether it would 
have been "feasible" or "reasonable" or simply a "good idea" for the man 
ufacturer to include a guard in the design of the saw. When the witness 
answers in the negative, the worker's attorney can introduce the evidence 
to show feasibility, if the witness has "controverted" that in her answer.41 
Alternatively, if the witness states the accident was too unlikely, or the 
guard insufficiently efficacious, to justify such a precaution, the plaintiff 
can use the postaccident redesign to impeach her by showing the manu 
facturer behaved in a way that seems to belie the witness's opinion.42 If 
the witness answers in the affirmative, that is even more advantageous for 
the plaintiff: The witness would be admitting the defendant's liability. 
Although Rule 407 explicitly describes proof of "feasibility" and "im 
peachment" as "other purpose [s],"43 the conceptual line between them 
and the one the SRM bar forbids is microscopically thin. The SRM ban 
forbids introduction of a subsequent measure to imply the defendant 
should have implemented it earlier?yet establishing the "feasibility" of 
such action is relevant only as a premise of exactly that inference. The 
proviso that feasibility must first be "controverted" is arguably meaning 
less: Denial of the feasibility of the precaution is implicit in the defen 
dant's contesting the plaintiff s claim.44 It is analytically possible for the 
factfinder to infer that the defense witness is not credible without con 
cluding that the defendant's behavior was substandard. But it seems psy 
40. See, e.g., Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1212-14 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding 
defendants had controverted feasibility of safety measures and vacating judgment based on 
district court's exclusion of evidence). 
41. See id. at 1213-14 ("The plaintiffs were entitled to show affirmatively that these 
devices were feasible . . . and [that the defendants] in fact installed the same devices that 
they testified could not be used successfully."); Jacobson v. Manfredi by Manfredi, 679 P.2d 
251, 254-55 (Nev. 1984) (applying Rule 407's exception for feasibility to allow admission 
of SRM proof where "the utility and safety" of original product versus post-SRM product 
were contested). 
42. See, e.g., Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 887 F.2d 34, 37-41 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(finding district court erred in excluding evidence of SRM that directly conflicted with 
defense witness's testimony). 
43. Fed. R. Evid. 407. 
44. See generally Weinstein & Berger, supra note 9, ? 7.04 [4] [c] ("[T]he feasibility of 
a precaution may bear on whether it was negligent not [to] have taken [it]; thus, 
negligence and feasibility are often not distinct issues."). 
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chologically impossible for the factfinder to treat adoption of the guard 
as a reason to suspect the witness of lying, or of simply being uninformed, 
if the factfinder does not at the same time treat that action as a reason to 
believe the manufacturer itself now recognizes it could and should have 
adopted the measure ex ante. In any case, because SRM proofs will inva 
riably be relevant to prove feasibility and to impeach defense witnesses, 
classifying these as "other purposes" raises the concern that a plaintiff will 
always be able to style the proof as one that avoids the SRM ban.45 
Courts follow one of two strategies for plugging this forbidden 
purpose loophole in the rule. One is to contort the meaning of "feasibil 
ity" and "impeachment." In everyday speech, when we describe a course 
of action as "infeasible," we typically mean to convey that it is unreasona 
bly costly or inconvenient.46 Nevertheless, in interpreting the SRM bar, 
some courts suggest that merely disputing the cost-effectiveness of a safety 
measure does not amount to "controverting" its "feasibility."47 Presuma 
bly, then, these courts see "controverting" the "feasibility" of a precaution 
as akin to asserting the literal impossibility of its adoption. But since a 
defendant need not demonstrate the impossibility?only the cost 
ineffectiveness?of a precaution to defeat liability,48 none is likely ever to 
"controvert feasibility" in that way. Courts also sometimes conclude that 
ex post adoption of a precautionary measure does not "impeach" a de 
fense witness who testifies that such a measure was deemed unreasonable, 
because it remains possible the accident itself revealed the utility of the 
measure.49 This is just a variant of the misguided claim that SRM proofs 
are necessarily "irrelevant." Whether or not it rules out alternative expia 
45. See id. ? 7.04[4] [a] ("[Particularly in the case of feasibility and impeachment, 
care should be taken that a mechanical reliance on the permissible uses specified in Rule 
407 does not subvert the policy goals the Rule is designed to promote."). 
46. See Anderson, 700 F.2d at 1213 ("Whether something is feasible relates not only to 
actual possibility of operation, and its cost and convenience, but also to its ultimate utility 
and success in its intended performance. That is to say, 'feasible' means not only 
'possible,' but also means 'capable of being . . . utilized, or dealt with successfully.'" 
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 831 (unabridged ed. 1967))); 
accord Jacobson, 679 P.2d at 255 (quoting identical language). 
47. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding 
"feasibility . . . distinct from the net advantages" of disputed safety measure); Tuer v. 
McDonald, 701 A.2d 1101, 1110 (Md. 1997) ("[Feasibility is not controverted?and thus 
subsequent remedial evidence is not admissible under the Rule?when a defendant 
contends that the design or practice complained of was chosen because of its perceived 
comparative advantage over the alternative design or practice." (citing Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 
468)). 
48. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical 8c Emotional Harm ? 3 cmt. 
e (2010) (stating negligence standard "can also be called a 'cost-benefit test,' where 'cost' 
signifies the cost of precautions and the 'benefit' is the reduction in risk those precautions 
would achieve"); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. ? 2 cmt. d (1998) ("More 
specifically, the test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have 
reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
49. See, e.g., Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("Evidence that the forklift's design had been altered does not contradict that statement 
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nations, an SRM proof gives the factfinder more reason than it would 
have had to infer the witness is dissembling or ignorant. More reason to 
discount, not sufficient reason to discount, is all it takes to make evidence 
relevant for impeachment.50 In fact, candid courts do not deny these 
points. They point out, however, that giving "feasibility" and "impeach 
ment" their normal meanings here would enable systematic evasion of 
the categorical ban on SRM proofs and thus thwart the policies that ani 
mate the rule.51 
A second strategy, however, exploits the porousness of the 
forbidden-purpose element to enable evasion, but only selectively. This 
position accepts that SRM proofs aimed at rebutting claims of cost 
ineffectiveness, and at discrediting witnesses who advocate those claims, 
fall outside the forbidden-purpose element of the rule. Nevertheless, 
such a conclusion does not entail categorical admission of such proofs; 
rather, it permits exclusion of them under Rule 403 (or its equivalent) 
when a court determines, on the basis of case-specific analysis, that their 
probative value is outweighed by prejudice. One element of prejudice 
that courts using this approach take into account is the adverse impact 
that permitting feasibility and impeachment proofs too readily could 
have on the policy aims promoted by the SRM rule. In effect, courts use 
Rule 403 to police the perimeter of Rule 407.52 
They can even use Rule 403 to extend that perimeter. When they 
are motivated to enforce the policy aims of Rule 407 by excluding feasibil 
since alteration did not compel the conclusion that the first design was defective." 
(emphasis omitted)). 
50. See 3 Christopher B. Mueller 8c Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence ? 6:86 (3d 
ed. 2009) (noting "[s]ometimes initial testimony and counterproof conflict completely, 
literally, and inescapably," and at "other times the initial testimony and counterproof 
conflict in more subtle ways"); see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49-51 (1984) 
(holding Rule 401's liberal "any tendency" standard applicable to admissibility of 
impeachment proof). 
51. See Minier v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting, 
because subsequent remedial measures always "contradict" and thus impeach in formal 
sense, courts must demand more in order to preserve Rule 407 from annihilation (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 468 ("Although any evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures might be thought to contradict and so in a sense 
impeach a defendant's testimony that he was using due care at the time of the accident, if 
this counted as 'impeachment' the exception would swallow the rule."); Tuer, 701 A.2d at 
1112 (asserting "[the] pragmatically necessary[ ] view is that the impeachment exception 
cannot be read in so expansive a manner" as to cover contradiction by conduct). 
52. See, e.g., Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 415-16 (3d Cir. 
2002) ("Under Rule 407, together with the Rule 403 unfair prejudice/probative value 
weighing, the trial court retains broad power to insure that remedial measures evidence is 
not improperly admitted under the guise of the impeachment exception." (footnote 
omitted)); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that, in 
order for "central policy behind the rule ... to be effectuated," feasibility proofs should be 
admitted only after determination that probative weight is extremely high); Weinstein 8c 
Berger, supra note 9, ? 7.04[4] [a] (counseling use of Rule 403 to prevent use of feasibility 
and impeachment proofs from undercutting policy rationales of Rule 407). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.182 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 19:44:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2010] ECONOMICS OF SRM EVIDENCE 1629 
ity and impeachment proofs under Rule 403, courts are necessarily recog 
nizing that their power to combat the prejudice the SRM ban seeks to 
avoid is not limited to evidence offered for the purpose forbidden by the 
rule. Accordingly, other forms of proofs that technically fall outside the 
scope of the ban, including its definitional element, can also be excluded 
if courts determine that admission of these proofs will upset either the 
CLEC or BLEC rationales for the rule (or even the expressive one, for 
that matter). For example, courts that have concluded that Rule 407 
does not apply to third-party remedial measures can still exclude such 
evidence under Rule 403 if they believe the distorting effect of hindsight 
bias will outweigh whatever licit probative value such evidence conveys.53 
Or consider so-called "postmanufacture, preaccident remedial mea 
sures" (PPRMs). An example would be if the saw manufacturer added a 
guard to a new model of the saw after some users were injured but before 
the plaintiff suffered his misadventure with the original model of the saw. 
Permitting the plaintiff to introduce this PPRM design change into evi 
dence would seem to punish the precautionary behavior of the manufac 
turer in exactly the same way and invite reliance on hindsight by the jury 
to the same extent as do conventional SRM proofs. On this basis, some 
courts have construed PPRM proofs as within the scope of the SRM 
rule.54 Reacting against this position, however, the Advisory Committee 
enacted an amendment to Rule 407 purportedly "to clarify that the rule 
applies only to changes made after the occurrence that produced the 
damages giving rise to the action" and not to "measures taken by the 
defendant prior to the 'event' causing 'injury or harm' . . . even if they 
occurred after the manufacture or design of the product."55 Amusingly, 
the amended language remains patently ambiguous on the status of 
PPRM proofs: "When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an 
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the 
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible . . . ,"56 Nothing in this formulation compels identifying the 
particular "injury or harm allegedly caused by an event," the likelihood of 
which would have been reduced had "subsequent measures" been "taken 
previously."57 But even if one gives the language its apparently intended 
53. See, e.g., Middleton v. Harris Press 8c Shear, Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 752 (5th Cir. 
1986) ("[EJvidence of subsequent changes by third parties is properly excludable because 
of its tendency 'to confuse the jury by diverting its attention from whether the product was 
defective at the relevant time [i.e., the time of manufacture] to what was done 
later.'"(citation omitted)). 
54. See, e.g., Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(holding PPRM proofs to be within Rule 407 because "policy [behind the rule] is equally as 
supportive of exclusion of evidence of safety measures taken before someone is injured by 
a newly manufactured product, even if those measures are taken in response to experience 
with an older product of the same or similar design"). 
55. Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee's note to 1997 amends. 
56. Fed. R. Evid. 407 (emphasis added). 
57. Id. 
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effect, PPRM proofs are not per se admissible. Like other forms of 
"[e]vidence of subsequent measures . . . not barred by Rule 407," PPRM 
proofs remain "subject to exclusion on Rule 403 grounds."58 As a result, 
courts can still ban such proofs when, after a case-specific balancing, they 
determine that the licit probative value of the proofs is outweighed by 
their negative effects on primary conduct or on factfmding.59 
But determining whether in any given case the risk of prejudice out 
weighs the probity of a PPRM proof?or of a third-party SRM proof, or an 
SRM feasibility or impeachment proof?will always be a judgment call.60 
The judge's decision, moreover, will necessarily be influenced by how 
compelling she finds the CLEC and BLEC rationales (as well as the 
noneconomic expressive justification) for the SRM ban. The more per 
suaded a judge is of the soundness of those rationales in general, the 
more likely she will be to see them as outweighing any probative value of 
a "permissible" SRM proof in a particular case; the less persuaded, the 
less likely. 
Indeed, one objection to the use of Rule 403 to demarcate the 
boundary between permissible and impermissible SRM proofs would be 
that it effectively strips the SRM ban of its categorical character.61 Rule 
403 is up to the task of policing the Rule 407 perimeter. But if Rule 403 is 
the only device a judge employs to limit use of SRM evidence for proving 
feasibility or for impeachment, then Rule 407 will never require her to 
exclude evidence she would have admitted if Rule 403 were the sole limit 
on SRM proofs. Similarly, if a judge overtly relies on the policy rationales 
to determine what the definitional and forbidden-purpose elements of 
the SRM rule mean, she will conclude Rule 407 applies only when she 
would likely have invoked those rationales to exclude under Rule 403 
anyway. It is not the "exceptions" to the SRM rule, but rather the attrae 
58. Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee's note to 1997 amends. 
59. See, e.g., Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(excluding PPRM proof on Rule 403 grounds). 
60. See generally Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) 
(explaining that because Rule 403 "requires an on-the-spot balancing of probative value 
and prejudice, potentially to exclude as unduly prejudicial some evidence that already has 
been found to be factually relevant, . . . courts of appeals [should] uphold Rule 403 rulings 
unless the district court has abused its discretion" (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) ). 
61. This is a charge made about judicial application of both the categorical exclusion 
rules generally and the bar on character propensity proofs in particular. See, e.g., D. 
Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and 
"Offender Profiling": Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 
24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193, 206 (2002) (noting "ill-defined and indeterminate" line between 
permissible and impermissible uses of character evidence has resulted in admissibility 
decisions being "heavily subject to non-doctrinal influences like the judge's idiosyncratic 
personal views"). 
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tion of relying on its policy rationales to guide its application in particular 
cases, that threatens to swallow the SRM rule.62 
But is this really such a bad outcome? It depends on how compelling 
the CLEC and BLEC rationales are as grounds for excluding evidence 
categorically. If the rationales for the SRM ban furnish, at best, case 
specific grounds for exclusion, then we should be celebrating, not re 
sisting, the transmutation of Rule 407 into Rule 403. I suggest that the 
economic rationales for the rule support only selective, not categorical, 
exclusion of SRM proofs. 
II. The Behavioral Economics of the SRM Rule 
I start with a critique of the BLEC justification for the SRM rule. 
That justification asserts factfinders are likely to overvalue SRM proofs as 
a result of hindsight bias. I do not dispute this claim. The problem is 
that the argument neglects to weigh the benefit of preventing the 
factfinder from giving too much weight to SRM proofs against the cost of 
constraining it always to give them too little, as necessarily happens when 
admittedly relevant evidence is excluded. A careful evaluation of that 
problem, I argue, suggests that case-by-case balancing is a superior 
approach. 
Bayesian theory, which specifies a mode of reasoning that a rational 
factfinder should follow in order to maximize the accuracy of her deter 
minations,63 furnishes an appropriate normative framework for evaluat 
ing the BLEC argument. Using Bayes's Theorem, the rational factfinder 
can determine the impact any piece of evidence should have on her as 
sessment of the likelihood of a disputed fact and therefore gauge the risk 
of hindsight bias.64 
The linchpin of the theorem is the so-called "likelihood ratio," which 
quantifies how much more consistent a piece of evidence is with a partic 
ular factual proposition (or hypothesis) than with the negation of that 
proposition.65 Imagine that a witness testifies that was struck by a blue 
bus; imagine further that eight of ten X Company buses in the vicinity are 
blue, and only four of ten Y Company buses are blue. If we are assessing 
the proposition that "the bus that struck the plaintiff belonged to XCo., 
not F Co.," the likelihood ratio associated with the witness's testimony is 
two, since the evidence of the bus's color is twice as consistent with the 
62. See generally 23 Wright & Graham, supra note 10, ? 5282 (noting that 
commentators attribute uneven enforcement of Rule 407 to ambivalence about policy). 
63. See generally Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to 
Identification Evidence, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1970) (discussing application of Bayes's 
Theorem to help determine accuracy of evidence). 
64. See generally Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (1968) (explaining uses of Bayes's 
Theorem in decisionmaking). 
65. See Michael O. Finkelstein 8c Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers 75-76, 195-96 
(2d ed. 2001). 
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proposition that the bus that hit the plaintiff was an X bus than with the 
proposition that it was a Y bus.66 
Under Bayes's Theorem, the factfinder should multiply the odds she 
previously assigned to the proposition?referred to as the "prior odds"? 
by the likelihood ratio associated with the new evidence. The result, re 
ferred to as the "posterior odds," represents her revised assessment of the 
likelihood of the proposition.67 For example, imagine the factfinder as 
signed an initial probability of 40%?prior odds of 2:3?that an X Co. 
bus rather than a Y Co. bus struck because X Co. owns 40% and Y Co. 
60% of all the buses that travel along the location where the accident 
occurred.68 Based on the evidence that the bus was blue, she should now 
view the probability as 57%?2 2:3, or 4:3 posterior odds?that the of 
fending bus belonged to X Co.69 As should be clear, whenever the likeli 
hood ratio is greater than one, the new evidence will increase the esti 
mated likelihood of a proposition; whenever it is less than one, it will 
decrease the estimated likelihood; and whenever it is exactly one?mean 
ing the new evidence is equally consistent with the proposition and with 
its negation?the revised estimate will be the same as the original one. 
We can use the Bayesian framework as a gloss on concepts of rele 
vance and prejudice in evidence law. Evidence has at least some "ten 
dency to make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable'70?and thus is 
relevant?so long as that evidence has a likelihood ratio either greater or 
less than one, respectively. Evidence is prejudicial, from a Bayesian per 
66. A simple proof illustrates why. Imagine an experiment in which we randomly 
assigned subjects to be hit with equal probability (0.5 and 0.5) by one of X Company's 
buses, 80% of which are blue, or one of Y Company's buses, only 40% of which are blue. 
In that case, the probability that any given subject would be hit by a blue X Co. bus would 
be 0.5(0.8), or 0.4, whereas the likelihood that he or she would be hit by a blue F Co. bus 
would be 0.5(0.4), or 0.2. If we repeated the trial 1,000 times, we would expect subjects to 
be hit 400 times by a blue X Co. bus and only 200 times by a blue Y Co. bus. Accordingly, it 
is twice as likely that any subject hit by a blue bus will have been struck by an X Co. bus 
than by a Co. bus. In that sense, then, the evidence that the bus that hit was blue is 
twice as consistent with the proposition that an X Co. bus hit him or her than it is with the 
proposition that a Y Co. bus did. 
67. See Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 65, at 75-76. 
68. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1340-41 (1971) (stating famous "blue bus" problem and 
asking "[w]hat effect, if any . . . , should such [a] proof be given?"). 
69. Again, a simple proof can demonstrate this point. Imagine we randomly selected 
one bus from the entire set of X Co. and F Co. buses to run over P. There would thus be a 
40% chance that would be hit by an X Co. bus and a 60% chance that he or she would be 
hit by a Y Co. bus. The likelihood that would be hit by a blue X Co. bus is thus 2/5 (the 
likelihood that the bus belongs to XCo.) times 4/5 (the likelihood any XCo. bus is blue), 
or 8/25. The likelihood would be hit by blue F Co. bus is 3/5 (the likelihood that the 
bus belongs to Y Co.) times 2/5 (the likelihood that any Y Co. bus is blue), or 6/25. 
Accordingly, should be hit by a blue bus, the odds are 8:6, or 4:3?57%?that it will be 
an X Co. bus rather than a Y Co. bus. 
70. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added). 
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spective, whenever it induces the factfinder to assign to a fact a revised 
probability different from the product of the factfinder's prior odds and the 
likelihood ratio associated with that evidence.71 
Interpreted against the background of this theory, the prospect of 
hindsight bias does not make SRM proofs irrelevant. The defendant's 
implementation of a precaution aimed at preventing recurrence of an 
accident will at least sometimes be associated with a likelihood ratio 
greater or less than one for various facts of consequence. A particular 
preventive measure that would not have been reasonably justified at ti is 
less likely to be reasonably justified at t2 than one that would have been 
reasonably justified even at t?. Accordingly, the adoption of a preventive 
measure after an accident is more consistent with the conclusion that it 
would have been reasonable to adopt it before the accident than with the 
conclusion that it would not have been reasonable to adopt it at that 
time. In considering whether the defendant behaved unreasonably in 
failing to adopt the preventive measure ex ante, then, the likelihood ratio 
associated with adoption of such a measure ex post is greater than one.72 
Rather than being understood as denying that SRM proofs can ever 
be relevant, the BLEC rationale should be understood as deeming such 
proofs to be prejudicial in the Bayesian sense. According to this position, 
hindsight bias will drive factfinders who learn of an SRM to overestimate 
how readily the utility of such a measure could have been foreseen in 
advance. They give less weight than they should to any evidence that the 
accident itself furnished previously inaccessible information about the 
likelihood of such a misfortune; that changes in technology reduced the 
cost or increased the efficacy of the preventive measure; or that, after the 
accident, the defendant was moved to engage in supererogatory steps to 
avoid recurrence.73 Thus, in considering whether the defendant be 
haved in a substandard manner ex ante, they effectively assign a likeli 
hood ratio to ex post adoption of a precautionary measure that is higher 
than it should be, and as a result they form a higher revised estimate of 
the likelihood of substandard behavior than they rationally should. 
One could respond critically to this argument in a number of ways. 
One would be to question its empirical premises. Some commentators, 
for example, argue that it should be possible to counteract the distorting 
impact of hindsight bias by warning factfinders?presumably with a cau 
tionary instruction, reinforced by arguments of counsel?that they 
71. See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1027-31 
(1977) (articulating Bayesian interpretations of relevance and prejudice). 
72. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Finding Error, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1189, 
1197-1200 (explaining why it is generally rational to revise upward one's ex ante estimate 
of event's likelihood after receiving information that such event occurred). 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
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should be wary of this bias when considering the probative value of SRM 
proofs.74 
But there is an even more fundamental response to the BLEC argu 
ment so conceived. Even if we assume that SRM proofs generate hind 
sight bias, and that this distortion is essentially intractable, it does not 
follow within a Bayesian framework that such proofs should be categori 
cally, as opposed to selectively, excluded. 
The prejudicial effect of SRM proofs, according to BLEC, is that they 
are overvalued?that is, that as a result of hindsight bias, they are as 
signed more weight than they deserve. But being overvd?ue? does not 
make SRM proofs valued; they do, at least sometimes, justify revising 
upward an estimate of substandard conduct on the part of the defen 
dant?just not as much as factfinders are apparently wont to do. We can, 
in theory, compare how much it reduces the marginal likelihood of error 
when a factfinder gives an SRM proof too much weight with how much it 
reduces the marginal likelihood of error when a factfinder cannot give 
such a proof any weight. If we use a Bayesian conception of balancing 
probity and prejudice, the problem of overvaluation justifies exclusion 
only if the former exceeds the latter. 
Determining whether this condition is satisfied requires more infor 
mation about both the magnitude of the overvaluation and the prior 
odds the factfinder assigns to substandard behavior. Assume that a 
factfinder in effect believes that 100% of defendants who have behaved 
unreasonably by failing to adopt a precaution before an accident take 
steps to avoid recurrence, but that only 1% of defendants who behaved 
reasonably in failing to adopt precautions before do so after. Now as 
sume further that in reality only 50% of defendants who behaved unrea 
sonably before the accident take such steps after, while some 25% of de 
fendants who behaved reasonably in failing to take such steps at the 
outset still adopt such measures later (because of information not availa 
ble before, advances in technology, or the pull of guilty consciences). In 
that case, the factfinder, in considering whether the defendant behaved 
unreasonably, will assign a likelihood ratio of 100 to the SRM proof, 
whereas she should have assigned it a likelihood ratio of only 2?a 50-fold 
overvaluation. 
Is it beneficial to exclude the SRM proof under these circumstances? 
It depends on how likely the factfinder would be to deem the defendant's 
conduct substandard, absent the SRM proof. Imagine a case in which it 
seems fairly unlikely, say 10% (prior odds of 1:9), that the defendant is at 
fault without such evidence. In that case, upon receipt of an SRM proof, 
74. See Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 3, at 1527-29 (noting limited and 
weak nature of evidence that juries are subject to irrational form of hindsight bias). But 
see Kim A. Kamin 8c Jeff J. Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex Ante: Determining Liability in 
Hindsight, 19 Law 8c Hum. Behav. 89, 99-100 (1995) (presenting experimental mock jury 
evidence that postaccident measures influence perceived ex ante reasonableness of those 
measures and that cautionary instruction does not counteract this effect). 
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a rational factfinder?one that does not experience hindsight bias and 
that therefore assigns the evidence a likelihood ratio of 2, to continue 
with the example in the previous paragraph?would now believe the like 
lihood of negligence is still low, only 22% (2 1:9 
= 
posterior odds of 
2:9). In contrast, a factfinder who, as a result of hindsight bias, overvalues 
the evidence and assigns it a likelihood ratio of 100 would conclude that 
the likelihood of substandard behavior is 92% (100 1:9 = posterior odds 
of 100:9, or approximately 11:1), and thus mistakenly hold the defendant 
liable. 
Yet imagine a closer case, one in which the factfinder's estimate of 
faulty or substandard behavior prior to receipt of the SRM proof is 45% 
(prior odds of 9:11). Upon introduction of the SRM proof, a factfinder 
that overvalues such evidence as a result of hindsight bias would conclude 
that the likelihood of substandard behavior is 99% (100 9:1 = posterior 
odds of 900:11 or approximately 90:1), and thus find the defendant lia 
ble. A factfinder that accurately values SRM evidence would conclude 
that the likelihood of negligence (or whatever species of substandard be 
havior suffices to establish liability) is only 62% (2 9:11 
= 
posterior odds 
of 18:11). But while smaller than 99%, a likelihood of 62% is still suffi 
ciently high (under a preponderance of the evidence standard) to rule in 
the plaintiffs favor. Accordingly, it is now the exclusion of such evi 
dence, which would leave the factfinder with an estimated likelihood of 
fault (45%) below the threshold for liability, that would result in a mis 
taken verdict?a finding of no liability. If our goal is to minimize the 
likelihood of an erroneous outcome, then admitting the evidence is war 
ranted despite the problem of overvaluation associated with hindsight 
bias. 
These numbers are obviously hypothetical. But they illustrate that 
hindsight bias does not necessarily justify categorical exclusion of SRM 
proofs. Excluding such evidence means that the law will necessarily get 
the wrong result?a finding of no liability when the defendant was in fact 
negligent or otherwise faulty?in some class of cases. Without some em 
pirically grounded numbers, why simply assume that the loss of accuracy 
associated with too few judgments of liability is smaller than the loss of 
accuracy associated with too many? Perhaps "close" cases grossly 
predominate over "not close" ones. Or perhaps the discrepancy in likeli 
hood ratios is not nearly so huge as this hypothetical analysis supposes, in 
which case admission might pose only a very modest risk of erroneous 
findings of liability yet still contribute meaningfully to avoiding erroneous 
findings of no liability. 
Although the Bayesian analysis used here tells us nothing about the 
relative frequency of mistakes associated with invariably excluding or ad 
mitting SRM proofs, it does reveal something important about the nature 
of the cases in which exclusion and admission are likely, respectively, to 
result in an erroneous outcome (Figure 1). 
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However large or small the discrepancy in the true and perceived 
likelihood ratios associated with an SRM proof, admission of the proof 
causes a real-world factfinder to revise her prior odds to a greater degree 
than she would if she gave the evidence the weight it was due. Exclusion, 
on the other hand, preempts her from revising them at all, and hence 
from revising them as much as she would if she gave the evidence its 
proper effect. Under these circumstances, the question of which ruling 
presents the greater likelihood of error?admission or exclusion?will be 
highly dependent on the probative force of the non-SRM evidence in the 
case. Admission of an SRM proof is most likely to result in error when 
the non-SRM evidence strongly supports the defendant; that is the type of 
case in which an irrational factfinder, but not a rational factfinder, is 
likely to see the SRM proof as decisive evidence of substandard conduct. 
ABC 
perceived LR: 100 perceived LR: 100 perceived LR: 100 
Estimated Likelihood of Fault Before SRM Proof 
---- biased perception if 
? ? unbiased perception if 
?? 
perception if excluded 
admitted admitted 
Figure 1. Errors Associated with Admission and Exclusion of SRM Proof. Curves reflect 
Bayesian updating. In each graph, "unbiased perception if admitted" reflects the "true 
likelihood ratio" associated with an SRM proof; "biased perception if admitted" reflects the 
exaggerated "perceived likelihood" ratio caused by hindsight bias; and "perception if ex 
cluded" reflects a likelihood ratio of one to indicate the lack of any updating absent new 
evidence. The values assigned to those ratios are varied in graphs A, B, and C to illustrate 
how the magnitude of the difference between them influences the curves. Under the de 
picted conditions, admitting the evidence will result in a mistaken finding of liability when 
the estimated likelihood of fault without the SRM proof is within the dark gray zone, while 
excluding it will result in an erroneous finding of no liability when the estimated likeli 
hood of fault before the SRM proof is in the light gray zone. Neither admitting nor ex 
cluding the evidence will result in an erroneous outcome when the likelihood of fault 
before the SRM proof is in the white zone. 
The situation in which exclusion is most likely to result in error is 
when the evidence on liability is otherwise relatively close. In that type of 
case, exclusion presents a relatively high risk that the factfinder will fail to 
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find liability when a rational factfinder who is informed of and gives ap 
propriate weight to the SRM proof would. To be sure, the irrational 
factfinder in such a case will give the SRM proof more weight than the 
rational factfinder would, and so will be even more confident: in the hy 
pothetical, a feeling of 99% confidence, as opposed to 62%, that the de 
fendant behaved in a substandard way. But because, under a preponder 
ance of the evidence standard, the rational factfinder apprised of the 
SRM proof would also be confident enough (62%) to find the defendant 
liable, the overly exuberant irrational factfinder will still be getting the 
right result when the proof is admitted. 
Finally, there are cases in which the evidence otherwise strongly sup 
ports the plaintiff. Because the plaintiff is likely to win regardless of 
whether the SRM proof is admitted or excluded in such a case, minimiz 
ing error does not furnish a reason for either disposition. 
This picture of the conditions in which error of one sort or another 
is likely to occur suggests the potential utility of a selective rather than a 
categorical exclusion rule for SRM evidence. If a judge excludes SRM 
proofs in cases in which the plaintiff s case is otherwise weak, and is re 
ceptive to admission of such proofs in cases in which the issue of the 
defendant's substandard conduct is otherwise close, she will minimize the 
sum total of erroneous outcomes?either mistaken findings of liability or 
mistaken findings of nonliability?relative to a rule that categorically ex 
cludes or admits such proofs. In cases in which the plaintiff s case is oth 
erwise strong, exclusion is unlikely to result in error (the plaintiff should 
win anyway) and can be justified on grounds of avoiding "undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."75 But to 
be confident that she does not inadvertently exclude evidence on that 
ground in what is in fact a close case, the judge should be sure to set a 
fairly high threshold for identifying a "strong" plaintiff case (Figure 2).76 
75. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
76. For a more thoroughgoing expression of skepticism toward "overvaluation" as a 
ground for excluding relevant evidence in general, see Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing 
the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 Mich. St. L. Rev. 967, 969-71. Friedman reasons 
that because truth-seeking warrants exclusion only when the degree of "over-valuation 
exceeds the 'appropriate' valuation" of evidence, a court should exclude evidence only 
when it concludes "the jury is according more than double the appropriate weight to the 
evidence." Id. at 969. In my view, this analysis furnishes insufficient attention to the role 
that the strength of the remaining evidence in the case plays in assessing the respective 
risks of error associated with admitting and excluding overvalued evidence. 
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perceived LR: 100 
true LR: 2 
Exclude: Admit: Exclude: 
biased perception if 
admitted 
unbiased perception if 
admitted 
perception if excluded 
Estimated Likelihood of Fault Before SRM Proof 
Figure 2. Optimal Selective-Exclusion Strategy. Curves reflect Bayesian updating. "Unbi 
ased perception if admitted" reflects the "true likelihood ratio" associated with an SRM 
proof; "biased perception if admitted" reflects the exaggerated "perceived likelihood" ratio 
caused by hindsight bias; and "perception if excluded" reflects a likelihood ratio of one to 
indicate the absence of any updating absent new evidence. Under the depicted condi 
tions, the approach most likely to generate a correct outcome is for the court to exclude 
the evidence on the ground that prejudice exceeds probative value when the estimated 
likelihood of fault without the SRM proof is within the dark gray zone; and admit it on the 
ground that probative value exceeds prejudice when the estimated likelihood of fault 
before the SRM proof is in the light gray zone. When the estimated likelihood of fault 
before the SRM proof lies in the white zone, the evidence can, at a reasonably small risk of 
error, be excluded on the grounds that it is cumulative. 
This selective exclusion strategy is potentially optimal, but is it feasi 
ble? If we thought that judges lacked the capacity to distinguish "close" 
cases from others, then it might make sense to adopt a categorical exclu 
sion rule (or possibly a categorical admission rule!)77 on the theory that 
admission is more likely to lead to error than exclusion (or vice versa) in 
the run of cases. 
But such skepticism about judges' powers of discernment seems odd. 
Distinguishing cases in which the evidence is otherwise "strong" from 
ones in which the evidence is otherwise "close" is what judges do rou 
tinely when they perform the sort of case-by-case balancing contemplated 
by Rule 403. When weighing the "probative value" against the "risk of 
prejudice" associated with a piece of evidence, judges measure those qual 
77. Cf. id. at 970 (suggesting one reason for judges to be reluctant to treat 
overvaluation of evidence as basis for excluding admittedly relevant proofs is difficulty 
judges themselves are likely to have in assessing both potential jury overvaluation of such 
evidence and actual appropriate weight to give it). 
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ities not in absolute but in marginal terms. That is, rather than consider 
ing a piece of "evidence ... as an island, with estimates of its own proba 
tive value and unfairly prejudicial risk [as] the sole reference points," the 
court must "take account of the full evidentiary context of the case as the 
court understands it."78 A piece of evidence that has considerable proba 
tive force when considered in isolation might contribute little to determi 
nation of a fact amply addressed by "substitute[]," "alternative," or al 
ready admitted pieces of evidence.79 In that case, the marginal probative 
value of such evidence is low, and a judge should not hesitate to conclude 
that the prejudice associated with it, even if modest, justifies exclusion. 
By the same token, a judge should be more reluctant to treat even appre 
ciable prejudice as outweighing probative value when a piece of evi 
dence?even one of modest probative force in isolation?makes a unique 
and critical contribution to the accurate determination of an important 
fact in light of the other evidence presented in the case.80 The case for 
categorical exclusion, then, rests on untested (and likely untestable) em 
pirical premises about the respective error costs associated with admission 
and exclusion of SRM proofs generally. But the only empirical assump 
tion needed to justify selective exclusion is that courts are competent and 
"take account of the full evidentiary context"81 of cases in exactly the way 
we already expect them to do in enforcing Rule 403. 
Maybe we should worry, though, that in making such a determina 
tion about SRM proofs, a judge's assessment will itself be distorted by 
hindsight bias. When she learns the defendant has adopted a postacci 
dent precaution, the judge might be moved to overestimate how readily 
the precaution's utility could have been foreseen ex ante, and hence to 
overestimate the probative force of the alternative evidence on exactly 
that issue. If so, the judge might be induced by the SRM proof itself to 
mistake a "weak" plaintiff case for a "close" one and thus find reason to 
admit the proof when she should exclude it. As a strategy for containing 
their own bias in particular cases, then, judges should commit themselves 
to a rule of categorical exclusion.82 
78. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182 (1997). 
79. Id. at 182-83. 
80. See id. (discussing approach to applying Rule 403 to evaluate single piece of 
evidence's probative value versus potential prejudice in light of case's entire evidentiary 
context); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note (counseling that "[t]he 
availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor" in weighing 
probative value against prejudice); 22 Wright 8c Graham, supra note 10, ? 5214 (noting 
that "in measuring probative worth under Rule 403 the judge" must consider not only 
"challenged evidence" but "other evidence already introduced or available to the 
proponent," for "[j]ust as the probative worth of the evidence may decline when compared 
to the need for its use, so may that value increase when considered in connection with 
other evidence in the same or adjacent lines of proof). 
81. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182. 
82. But see Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &: Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by 
Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773, 802-13 (2004) (discussing judges' concern over their 
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The concern that judges' ability to constrain factfinder bias will be 
constrained by judges' own susceptibility to the same biases is a reasona 
ble one, but it is a difficulty endemic to the sort of policing function we 
expect judges to engage in under Rule 403.83 As sch olars applying BLEC 
insights have persuasively argued, Rule 403 equips judges to safeguard 
factfinding from all manner of cognitive bias?from the "availability heu 
ristic" to "coherence [-]based reasoning" to "representativeness bias."84 
The capacity of judges to administer case-specific, Rule 403 balancing as 
an antidote to every one of these decisionmaking pathologies presup 
poses that judges can themselves resist them sufficiently to consider how 
much they detract from any particular piece of evidence's probative 
value. Empirical investigation of judicial decisionmaking furnishes sup 
port for the conclusion that judges can, in performing certain profes 
sional tasks at least, develop habits of mind that help them to counteract 
various biases that afflict lay persons.85 Without empirical evidence to 
support it, any assertion that hindsight bias uniquely contaminates 
judges' capacities to decide whether that same bias warrants admission or 
exclusion in particular cases amounts to the sort of just-so storytelling 
that has become a well-known embarrassment to classical L&E86?one 
own susceptibility to hindsight bias, as demonstrated by empirical evidence of judges' 
nonapplication of "fraud by hindsight" doctrine in securities class action cases). 
83. See generally Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence 
Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 165, 184, 197 (2006) (suggesting judges need type of cognitive 
corrective function played by rules of evidence). 
84. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 19, at 510-20 (discussing Rule 403's application in 
context of availability heuristic and representativeness bias) ; Dan Simon, A Third View of 
the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511, 568 
(2004) (discussing Rule 403's application in context of coherence-based reasoning). 
85. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski 8c Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the 
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 28 (2007) (showing power of 
judges to resist various biases, albeit imperfectly); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, 
86 Judicature 44, 50 (2002) (listing ways in which judges can minimize effects of cognitive 
illusions in deciding cases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich 8c 
Chris Guthrie, Does LInconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1195, 1221 (2009) (finding that, while judges hold similar implicit biases as lay people, 
they are able to resist influence of such biases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & 
Andrew J. Wistrich, Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges, 163 J. Institutional 8c 
Theoretical Econ. 167, 184 (2007) (same); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately 
Disregarding, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1259 (2005) [hereinafter Wistrich et al., Deliberately 
Disregarding] (finding that judges show power, albeit unevenly, to put inadmissible 
evidence out of mind when making rulings); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie 8c Andrew 
J. Wistrich, Context Effects in Judicial Decision Making 18 (Aug. 3, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1443596 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Reviezv) (same). 
86. See Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 822-25 ("[V]ery little in . . . most. . . writing on 
law 8c economics!] could be described as a rigorous attempt to falsify alternative 
explanations for a given phenomenon."). 
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that the best form of BLEC (and empirical legal studies generally) aspires 
to remedy.87 
For the same reason, I am not inclined to argue that my defense of 
selective exclusion explains the generally condemned transmutation of 
Rule 407 into Rule 403. That would be nothing more than a nice story, 
too. My point is only that a careful examination of the behavioral eco 
nomic rationale for the SRM rule would normatively justify selective, case 
by-case evaluation of that evidence if informed by judges' assessments of 
how close the case for liability is, independent of that evidence. 
III. The Conventional Economics of the SRM Rule 
The CLEC rationale asserts that the SRM rule is necessary to avoid 
discouraging adoption of socially desirable precautions. As a defense of 
categorical, rather than selective, exclusion, this argument also highlights 
the vulnerability of economic analysis to the seductive charms of ad 
hocery. 
The usual rejoinder to the CLEC defense of the SRM ban is that it 
indulges untested and implausible empirical premises.88 Imagine two 
prototypical defendants contemplating adoption of a reasonable precau 
tion to prevent recurrence of an accident. The first is a commercial man 
ufacturer, like that of the guardless electric saw in our running example, 
who produces a dangerous product that can be expected to present a 
continuing risk to consumers. The second is a noncommercial, private 
actor whose behavior has resulted in a chance injury to a stranger?say, 
the impalement of a newspaper delivery boy or girl by an icicle that fell 
from the eaves of a homeowner's roof. Even without the SRM rule, the 
manufacturer, according to the rejoinder, would be highly unlikely to 
forgo the adoption of a reasonable precaution because the benefit of 
avoiding liability for future accidents will almost certainly outweigh the 
cost of precaution-taking being used against it in pending litigation.89 
For the homeowner, it is plausible to imagine that the likelihood of recur 
rence might be sufficiently small to make running the risk of future injury 
worth the gamble to avoid any adverse inference associated with an SRM 
87. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Comment: Is Evolutionary Analysis of Law Science 
or Storytelling?, 41 Jurimetrics J. 365, 369-70 (2001) (deriding "story telling" modes of 
analysis in law and defending empirical legal studies). 
88. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs?A 
Rule in Need of Repair, 7 Forum 1, 6-7 (1971) (criticizing rule as lacking empirical 
foundation and plausibility). 
89. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence ? 5.17, at 
172-73 (2d ed. 1987) ("Whether this rule of exclusion actually affects one's willingness to 
undertake remedial steps is problematic and the assumption that it does has been seriously 
questioned. Arguably, even if the evidence of remedial measures were admissible, the 
actor would still make the necessary repairs or take other corrective action."); id. ("Failure 
to [take SRMs] poses for him the risk that another person would injure himself; 
furthermore, the second claimant's case would be strengthened by the fact that the 
defendant had notice of a possibly dangerous condition by reason of the first accident."). 
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proof. But what is not plausible, according to the rejoinder, is that this 
latter party would even be aware of, much less influenced by, rules of 
evidence.90 
Nevertheless, it turns out that even if we grant all of its empirical 
assumptions about how tort defendants are likely to be influenced by the 
prospect of admission of SRM proofs, the CLEC account suffers from a 
remarkable, and remarkably obvious, flaw: It is wholly one-sided in con 
sidering the behavioral incentives of an SRM ban. CLEC theory posits 
that parties are generally motivated to adopt reasonable precautions by 
the prospect of liability for failing to do so.91 Any legal rule, including 
one of proof or procedure, that diminishes the likelihood of liability thus 
reduces the incentive the party has to take care.92 As a result of the SRM 
ban, parties can anticipate that they will be shielded from a damaging 
form of evidence and thus face less expected liability for the failure to 
adopt precautions ex ante. Accordingly, a party like the saw manufac 
turer in our example will have less incentive to equip its saw with an ad 
mittedly reasonable guard at the outset, before any accident even occurs. 
There is necessarily a tradeoff, then, between the societal benefit the 
SRM ban confers by removing a disincentive to adopt protective measures 
ex post, on the one hand, and the societal cost the rule imposes in dimin 
ishing incentives to adopt reasonable protective measures ex ante, on the 
other. The CLEC account never even mentions this tradeoff, much less 
furnishes us with empirical evidence that making it in favor of the ex post 
approach enhances net societal welfare. 
This problem is aggravated by what L&E commentators recognize as 
the interactive nature of the primary-conduct and adjudicatory 
factfinding dimensions of the SRM rule. Those commentators stress that 
how big an incentive parties have to avoid adopting reasonable precau 
tions after an accident is a function of the inappropriate overvaluation of 
such proofs. If juries could be counted on to give SRM proofs only the 
effect they rationally should, parties would not be discouraged from 
adopting precautions on the basis of information not reasonably discover 
able before an accident.93 But by the same token, how big an incentive 
parties have to avoid taking reasonable precautions before an accident is a 
function of the inappropriate undervaluation of SRM proofs. If categori 
90. See, e.g., 2 Mueller 8c Kirkpatrick, supra note 50, ? 4:50, at 71-72 ("[T]he rule 
against proving subsequent measures is not likely to be part of one's conscious or 
semiconscious assumptions or awareness."). 
91. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 33 
(1972) ("If. . . the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs of prevention, society is 
better off if those costs are incurred and the accident averted, and so in this case the 
enterprise is made liable, in the expectation that self-interest will lead it to adopt the 
precautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort judgments."). 
92. Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. 
Econ. 169, 176-79 (1968) (describing economic incentive to forego behavior as function 
of penalty and likelihood it will be imposed in criminal context). 
93. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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cal exclusion results in parties anticipating that juries will not give such 
evidence appropriate weight even when it is probative of substandard 
conduct before an accident (because juries will never learn of its exis 
tence), then we can be confident parties will be insufficiently motivated at 
the outset (when the initial saw design is worked out, for example) to 
adopt even those precautions that they have reason to know would be 
worthwhile. 
Determining the social desirability of a categorical exclusion rule 
thus requires comparing competing ex post and ex ante effects, the mag 
nitude of which are necessarily matters of speculation. Opponents of the 
SRM rule tend to argue that, even if SRM proofs were freely admissible, 
parties would always or nearly always adopt reasonable postaccident pre 
cautions either out of fear of future liability or out of ignorance of the 
rule.94 Because these commentators believe there is no ex post disincen 
tive for the SRM rule to remedy, it is obvious, on their reasoning, that the 
societal cost of the rule in discouraging precaution-taking ex ante ex 
ceeds the societal benefits of the rule. Proponents of the SRM rule obvi 
ously dispute the premise that liberal admission of SRM proofs would 
have no negative effect on the incentives of parties to adopt postaccident 
precautions.95 However, lacking empirical evidence to support this view, 
they necessarily lack any evidence that the societal benefit from neutraliz 
ing this disincentive is sufficiently large to offset the social cost the rule 
exacts in discouraging ex ante precaution-taking. Proponents of the rule 
have not even considered this problem, much less tried to estimate its 
size. 
Whereas it would be exceedingly difficult to obtain the empirical 
data necessary to resolve these issues, it is fairly easy to identify a regime 
that, no matter what these data might show, will be superior to categori 
cal exclusion. The first element of that regime is a selective exclusion 
rule for SRM proofs. As shown in the previous Part, the class of cases in 
which admission of SRM proofs would be most likely to lead to the erro 
neous imposition of liability are ones in which the remaining evidence 
strongly supports the defendant.96 These cases will consist disproportion 
ately of defendants that did in fact adopt all reasonable precautions ex 
ante. Under a selective exclusion regime, any such defendant can be rea 
sonably confident that if it chooses to adopt a new preventive measure 
after an accident?a measure that, by hypothesis, it could not reasonably 
have been expected to adopt before the accident?the court will exclude 
94. See, e.g., 2 Mueller 8c Kirkpatrick, supra note 50, ? 4:50, at 72 ("[Parties] are likely 
[to make products safer] regardless of evidentiary consequences in order to prevent 
further injuries and lawsuits and to avoid the possibility7 that inaction in the face of 
repeated accidents or injuries will itself be taken as proof of negligence, or as a basis for 
awarding punitive damages."). 
95. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee's note (explaining SRM rule is 
supported by "social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging 
them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety"). 
96. See supra Figure 1, Figure 2, and accompanying text. 
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that evidence based on Rule 403 balancing. Hence the defendant will 
not be deterred from adopting it. Any defendant against whom the evi 
dence is overwhelming also should not be discouraged from adopting a 
postaccident preventive measure, both because the court is likely to ex 
clude any SRM proof as cumulative and because the defendant is likely to 
lose anyway no matter what it does. 
The prospect of admission of an SRM proof under a selective exclu 
sion regime can thus be expected to discourage the adoption of precau 
tions only by defendants against whom the remaining evidence is rela 
tively close?a larger proportion of whom, by hypothesis, will in fact have 
behaved unreasonably by failing to adopt the precaution ex ante. Geared 
toward offsetting the disincentive effect for these defendants, the second 
element of an optimal selective exclusion regime for SRM proofs would 
be a provision for awarding punitive damages to any plaintiff that can 
show a defendant unreasonably failed to adopt an SRM after an accident. 
So long as the expected punitive sanction for such behavior (that is, the 
size of the award multiplied to offset the uncertainty of its imposition) is 
equal to or greater than the expected damages a defendant would have 
avoided had the SRM proof been excluded, this regime will neutralize 
litigation-driven incentives to forgo postaccident precautions just as effec 
tively as categorical exclusion.97 It will do so, however, without forcing 
society to bear the cost that categorical exclusion imposes in the form of 
reduced incentives to adopt precautions ex ante. 
There is nothing fanciful about the idea of using enhanced punish 
ment to promote steps to prevent parties from hiding their noncompli 
ance with legal duties. It is already consistent with tort law in many states, 
which treats deliberate decisions to minimize precaution-taking, moti 
vated by the desire to conceal evidence that could expose an entity to 
liability, as satisfying the enhanced culpability standard used to determine 
liability for punitive damages.98 A similar strategy was proposed by L&E 
minded scholars99 and adopted (more or less) by the Federal Sentencing 
97. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky 8c Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 875, 954 (1998) (defending "a simple formula 
for calculating punitive damages, according to which harm is multiplied by a factor 
reflecting the likelihood of escaping liability" and asserting that "courts and juries often 
will be able to obtain enough information about the likelihood of escaping liability to 
apply the theory reasonably well"). 
98. See, e.g., Bowden v. Caldor, 710 A.2d 267, 279 (Md. 1998) ("[T]aking . . . 
remedial or corrective action, promptly after the misconduct[,] 
. . . obviously should be a 
mitigating factor. On the other hand, 
. . . attempts to conceal or cover-up the misconduct, 
failure to take corrective action, and similar circumstances, support the deterrence value of 
a significant award." (citations omitted)); Martin v. Survivair Respirators, Inc., 298 S.W.3d 
23, 33-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding deliberate failure to take corrective action after 
multiple reports of life-threatening defects in firefighter air mask warranted $15 million 
punitive damage judgment). 
99. See Michael J. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of 
Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 395, 407 (1991) (arguing size of penalty should be 
sensitive to adoption of self-compliance measures). 
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Commission, by which corporate criminal offenders are (or were, prior to 
the de facto invalidation of the Guidelines100) punished more or less se 
verely depending on whether they have adopted a compliance program 
aimed at preventing recurrence of criminal wrongdoing by corporate 
agents.101 
Given the possibility of using a stick to promote ex post precaution 
taking while simultaneously promoting ex ante precautions, what could 
possibly have motivated L&E scholars to defend the efficiency of a car 
rot?one that secures reasonable ex post precautions only by undermin 
ing incentives to take reasonable ex ante ones? The only answer I can 
think of is a preference for storytelling that bolsters the credibility of L&E 
as a general framework of analysis by showing that L&E arguments "fit" 
rather than conflict with existing doctrine. 
IV. The Political Economy of the SRM Rule 
There is at least one more form of economic analysis, conspicuously 
absent from the prevailing L&E defenses of the SRM rule, that could eas 
ily be used to cast doubt on the wisdom of it. This is public choice theory, 
which helps to assess the likely efficiency of democratic lawmaking. 
The occasion for the application of this theory is the near 
universality of the SRM rule. Following Maine's 1996 capitulation, Rhode 
Island remains the only holdout against adoption of an SRM ban akin to 
that reflected in Federal Rule 407.102 As indicated, the efficiency of the 
SRM rule depends on a variety of uncertain empirical issues, including 
the impact of admitting SRM proofs on precaution-taking ex post and 
that of excluding them on precaution-taking ex ante. Absent a satisfac 
tory way to obtain data on these effects, why not treat support for the rule 
among the vast majority of democratically accountable rulemakers as evi 
100. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the 
opinion of the Court in part) (holding unconstitutional Congressional statutory provision 
that made Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandatory). 
101. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ? 8C2.5 (2009). This approach even 
more clearly informs the Environmental Protection Agency's policy on penalties for 
regulatory violations. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction 
and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,619 (Apr. 11, 2000) ("To provide an 
incentive for entities to disclose and correct violations . . . , the Policy reduces gravity-based 
penalties by 75% for violations that are voluntarily discovered and promptly disclosed and 
corrected . . . ."); see also David W. Case, Changing Corporate Behavior Through 
Environmental Management Systems, 31 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. 8c Pol'y Rev. 75, 92-93 
(2006) ("Related factors that encourage firms to adopt [Environmental Management 
Systems] are that prosecutorial decisions as to whether to bring a criminal enforcement 
action as well as mitigation in sentencing for corporate environmental crimes can be 
affected by the existence of such a management program."). 
102. Brian Fielding, Note, Rhode Island's 407 Subsequent Remedial Measure 
Exception: Why It Informs WTiat Goes Around Comes Around in Restatements (Second) 
8c (Third) of Torts, and a Modest Proposal, 14 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 298, 299 (2009) 
(finding Rhode Island's SRM rule "stands in direct contrast to its federal counterpart, 
as 
well as each of Rhode Island's forty-nine sister states" (footnotes omitted)). 
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dence that the societal gains from the ban predominate over societal 
losses? Don't such rulemakers have an interest in figuring out what rule 
advances the well-being of their citizenries? 
Sure they do, but it would be na?ve to assume that the public's inter 
est will be decisive in determining the behavior of such rulemakers. 
Public choice theory tells us that democratic lawmaking will be dispropor 
tionately responsive to smaller, more highly organized, more intensely 
interested groups than to larger ones on whom the costs and benefits of 
favorable legislative outcomes are more diffusely distributed: The former 
will be more motivated and better situated to overcome collective action 
constraints on securing member contributions (particularly campaign do 
nations) for the group good of influencing the political process.103 
These conditions perfectly describe the political environment surround 
ing the SRM rule. The major beneficiaries are manufacturers and their 
insurers, which can anticipate that an SRM rule will reduce their tort lia 
bility exposure by a sizeable amount. They can thus be counted on, 
through industry lobbying groups, to offer significant rewards to legisla 
tors who support enacting such a rule and thereafter resisting its repeal. 
The parties who are adversely affected by an SRM rule are members of 
the public generally, who correspondingly face a small and incalculable 
increase in the risk of suffering injury. They are unlikely even to notice 
the position legislators take on the SRM ban, much less take retaliatory 
action against them for supporting it. 
The story of the SRM rule in Maine fits this description.104 When 
Maine initially promulgated an SRM rule in 1975, it declined to adopt the 
equivalent of Rule 407. Instead, it treated SRM proofs as subject to selec 
tive exclusion under the state equivalent of Rule 403.105 For the next 
twenty years, the advisory committee, which continued to be responsible 
for amendments, consistently resisted proposals from business and insur 
ance groups to engraft the equivalent of Federal Rule 407 onto the Maine 
Code.106 Finally, those same groups took their case to the Maine Legisla 
ture, which in 1996 acceded to their wishes, leaving Rhode Island the last 
bastion of selective exclusion.107 
Even if public interest advocates could rally themselves to enact and 
defend selective exclusion rules in other states, however, their efforts 
103. See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and 
the Theory of Groups (rev. ed. 1971) (explaining why incentive for collective action 
disintegrates as size of group with common interest increases). 
104. See generally Peter L. Murray, Maine Evidence ? 407.1 (6th ed. 2007) 
(describing evolution of Maine Evidence Rule 407(a)). 
105. Id. at 173. 
106. Id. at 173-74. 
107. See id. at 174-75 (noting that after Maine Evidence Rules Advisory Committee 
and Supreme Judicial Court repeatedly rebuffed demands to conform Maine evidence law 
to Federal Rule 407, state legislature finally enacted bill with "the support of various 
business, insurance and municipal groups" that "conform[ed], word for word, with Federal 
Rule 407"). 
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would be worth relatively little. Despite its admitted objective of regulat 
ing primary and not just litigation conduct, Rule 407, like the remainder 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is treated as "procedural" in nature. 
Hence, under the regime of Hanna v. Plummer,108 Rule 407 is enforceable 
in federal diversity actions, irrespective of state evidence law to the con 
trary.109 Defendants that have adopted postaccident precautions and are 
sued in state court in Rhode Island or any future Rule 407 defector will 
remove to federal court whenever they can. The ones that will be able to 
do so will generally be companies that are incorporated and have their 
headquarters in some other state (like Delaware). These are the very de 
fendants (e.g., automobile companies, manufacturers of dangerous 
equipment, and the like) whose tortious conduct against their citizens 
states are likely to have the greatest stake in remedying. 
Effectively, then, manufacturers and insurers only have to exploit 
their collective action advantages sufficiently to win in one forum in or 
der to win everywhere. So long as they can be sure the United States 
Congress, which enacted Federal Rule 407 in the first place, blocks any 
effort to remove categorical exclusion from the Federal Rules, few states 
are likely to see it as worth the bother to adopt a selective exclusion rule 
for tort cases tried in their own courts. 
What does this analysis prove? Nothing, because public choice the 
ory, unsupported by confirmatory empirical investigation, furnishes just 
another storytelling template of the sort with which the economic analysis 
of law is richly stocked.110 But even as a conjecture, the political econ 
omy critique of the SRM rule does show why one cannot reliably draw any 
inference about the efficiency of the rule from its simple prevalence: 
There is ample reason to expect the SRM rule to be adopted and to per 
sist even if it is substantially detrimental to public welfare on net. Fur 
thermore, the ease with which one can use public choice theory to tell 
this unhappy story is simply more evidence of how conveniently selective 
L&E scholars have been in the relentlessly upbeat fables they have chosen 
to tell about the virtues of Rule 407. 
108. 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (noting existence of matters that, "though falling 
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of 
classification as either"). 
109. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470-72 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(holding Rule 407 procedural even though it has "substantive consequences" (citing 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472)); see also Rioux v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 582 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D. 
Me. 1984) ("[T]he Hanna v. Plumer test applies to the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). 
110. See generally Donald P. Green 8c Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice 
Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science 5-7 (1994) (critiquing public 
choice storytelling in political science and economics as "not rest [ing] on a readily 
identifiable set of empirical successes"). 
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Conclusion 
In this Essay, I have tried to use L&E tools to criticize a rule of evi 
dence?the categorical exclusion of SRM proofs?that L&E theory is con 
ventionally thought to justify. By focusing only on how hindsight bias 
invests SRM proofs with too much weight, BLEC ignores how categorical 
exclusion necessarily invests such proofs with too little. BLEC scholar 
ship, as admirable as it undeniably is for injecting psychological realism 
into economics analysis, fails to consider the relative magnitude of these 
two effects or to identify conditions in which one is likely to predominate 
over the other. 
The CLEC rationale suffers from a similar one-sidedness. The SRM 
rule removes an incentive to adopt optimal precautions ex post. How 
ever, by excluding relevant evidence, the rule also predictably reduces the 
likelihood that a faulty actor will be found liable, thereby undermining 
incentives to engage in optimal precaution-taking ex ante. Again, com 
mentators who advance this rationale have made no effort to determine 
the relative weight of these effects or to identify mechanisms that would 
mitigate this tradeoff. 
L&E scholars have also been strikingly silent about the political econ 
omy of the SRM rule. Because it confers large benefits on intensely inter 
ested, highly organized groups?manufacturers and their insurers?and 
imposes uncertain costs over a large, diffuse group of ordinary citizens, 
public choice theory suggests the rule is likely to be adopted and persist 
notwithstanding any negative effect on public welfare. 
One goal of this analysis was practical: to defend and suggest the 
mechanics of a superior selective exclusion alternative to the SRM ban. A 
Bayesian analysis reveals that, to minimize verdict error, selective exclu 
sion should be tied to the relative strength of the parties' cases. Exclu 
sion is most warranted when the plaintiff s case is otherwise weak. These 
are the cases in which the discrepancy between the modest weight SRM 
proofs are due, relative to how much weight factfinders are inclined to 
give them, is most likely to result in an erroneous finding of liability. In 
contrast, admission is most warranted when the plaintiffs case is other 
wise of middling strength. These are the cases in which even exclusion is 
most likely to result in a mistaken finding of no liability: Because even 
the modest weight that SRM proofs are due would likely tip the judgment 
of a rational factfinder toward the plaintiff, the greater weight quasi-ra 
tional factfinders would give those proofs still would lead them to the 
right decision. Exclusion, on the other hand, would dispose them to a 
mistaken verdict for the defendant. Cases in which the plaintiffs evi 
dence is otherwise very strong are ones in which neither admission nor 
exclusion is likely to affect the result, and exclusion can be justified on 
grounds of avoiding duplicative or wasteful proof.111 
111. See supra Figure 1. 
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According to these guidelines, selective exclusion would, if coupled 
with provision for punitive damage awards, also tend toward optimal in 
centives to adopt precautions. The cases in which the plaintiffs evidence 
is otherwise weak?where exclusion would be justified as indicated 
above?are likely to be dominated by ones in which the defendant en 
gaged in adequate precautions ex ante. The prospect that exclusion of 
SRM proofs in such cases will undermine parties' ex ante incentives to 
take precautions is thus moot ex hypothesi. In close cases, the prospect 
that SRM proofs will be admitted gives potential defendants an ex ante 
incentive to take the precautions necessary to make sure their evidence is 
strong should any case arise against them. Admission in such cases might 
create incentives to avoid taking postaccident precautions, but that effect 
can be offset with the threat of punitive damages for defendants found to 
have deliberately avoided adopting such measures. And finally, the in 
centive effects of any approach to SRM proofs in instances when plain 
tiffs' cases are otherwise strong are negligible.112 
Accordingly, if there were no SRM rule, the best approach would be 
for courts to use criteria based on relative case strength to make case 
specific determinations of admissibility under Rule 403 or its state law 
equivalents. Such determinations, in fact, would be perfectly compatible 
with the probity-prejudice balancing contemplated by Rule 403, which 
requires courts to weigh the probative value of evidence at the margin? 
that is, with reference to the contribution that evidence makes to accu 
rate factfmding, considering the strength of the remaining evidence. 
Conveniently, implementing this approach does not even require re 
pealing the SRM rule. As is well remarked, the rule is rife with concep 
tual ambiguities, particularly relating to the distinction between permissi 
ble and forbidden purposes for SRM proofs. To resolve these 
ambiguities, courts must continually assess just how broadly the rule 
should be read in order to promote its animating purposes. The eco 
nomic analysis that I have presented in this Essay is geared toward answer 
ing exactly that question. Accordingly, were courts to be guided by this 
analysis when they make use of its economic rationales to interpret the 
rule, they would end up enforcing a selective exclusion SRM ban that has 
exactly the dimensions I propose. 
Another way to put it is that courts already tend to engage in the 
functional equivalent of Rule 403 analysis whenever they purport to rule 
on the applicability of the SRM rule. This dynamic disturbs some com 
mentators because it tends to transform the SRM ban from a mechanical, 
categorical one into a highly discretionary, selective exclusion one.113 I 
propose embracing and exploiting this dynamic to make application of 
the rule conform to the best understandings (or at least the best eco 
112. See supra Figure 2. 
113. See generally 23 Wright & Graham, supra note 10, ? 5282 (noting that 
commentators attribute uneven enforcement of Rule 407 to ambivalence about policy). 
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nomic understandings) of its rationales, which inescapably demand atten 
tion to case-specific considerations. 
It is tempting to suggest that this account of how the rule should 
work in fact explains in whole or in part how it does. There are myriad 
examples of cases that reach different results on the admissibility of ana 
lytically indistinguishable SRM proofs (particularly when offered to show 
feasibility or to impeach).114 Perhaps close investigation of the facts in 
these cases (and in particular the strength of the evidence independent 
of the SRM proofs) could (with enough narrative fitting and shaping) 
reconcile these decisions on the basis of the economic analyses I have 
developed. The moral of the story, on this account, would be the usual 
one for L&E?that the life of the law is neither logic nor experience, but 
efficiency. 
This sort of account, however, would conflict with the second goal of 
the Essay: to register a protest about the path the economic analysis of 
evidence seems intent on following. It is the very path taken by L&E on 
its way to its preeminence in legal scholarship generally, and it consists of 
the accumulation of theoretical analyses demonstrating the efficiency of 
existing doctrine. On its surface, this exercise in rationalization purports 
to justify the law on normative grounds. But just as important, this form 
of theorizing served, historically, to justify L&E as a credible mode of 
analysis by demonstrating its apparent power to systematize large bodies 
of law.115 
The L&E defenses of Rule 407, like many other recent applications 
of economic analysis to evidence, fit this pattern. By showing how the 
asserted rationales for the rule can be cashed out in CLEC or BLEC 
terms, they reveal and amplify the wisdom of the rule. And at the same 
time, by showing that yet another rule we have reason to believe makes 
sense?how else to explain its near universal and enduring use??is ex 
actly what their theories would prescribe, the analysis deepens our confi 
dence in L&E. 
Whatever one might think about the contribution doctrinal rationali 
zation has made to L&E generally, this is a route to academic acceptance 
114. Compare Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("Evidence that the forklift's design had been altered does not contradict th[e] statement 
[that the forklift was of 'proper design'] since alteration did not compel the conclusion 
that the first design was defective." (emphasis omitted)), with Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, 
Inc., 887 F.2d 34, 38-41 (3d Cir. 1989) (deeming subsequent use of a "decal warning of 
projectile hazard 
. . . admissible for impeachment purposes" because it "served directly to 
contradict [the witness's] claim" that product had been safely designed). 
115. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 
87 Colum. L. Rev. 1447, 1459-62 (1987) (reviewing William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987) and discussing relationship between 
normative and positive economic theories of law); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 
822-25 ("[P]ositivism in practice quickly decays into a kind of mathematically supported 
storytelling [that] is of particular concern in law & economics . . . ."). 
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that ought to be closed to the economic analysis of evidence. The rules 
of evidence are already fully and perniciously self-rationalizing. 
The rules of evidence both presuppose and shape our understand 
ings of how the natural and social worlds work. A court can determine 
whether evidence makes a "fact... of consequence 
. . . more probable 
or 
less"116 only by recourse to empirical generalizations, themselves extrinsic 
to the rules, that give the evidence meaning.117 Proof that the victim was 
having an affair with the defendant's wife, for example, is relevant proof 
of the defendant's motivation to kill him, but only because we learned, 
long before being sworn in as jurors, that adultery can spark rage. But of 
course one source of our awareness of (or better, our imperceptible as 
sent to) such generalizations is the law itself. We all know that infidelity 
can trigger fury?indeed, we learn in some sense that it should?because 
we see courts treat it as evidence not only that one man killed another, 
but that he did so on account of "provocation" that was "sufficient to 
arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man."118 
As Jennifer Mnookin's writings on expert evidence engagingly illus 
trate, this recursive process is rife with comic misadventure.119 The ac 
ceptance of still pictures as a form of proof was retarded by the suspicion 
of some courts, which regarded photography as something akin to 
magic.120 Today, the judicial system reinforces our inattention to the dis 
torting influence of perspective when we view a photo or film?a recog 
nized form of cognitive bias?by insisting that visual media be afforded 
near-dispositive significance.121 The polygraph, in contrast, has never re 
covered from the discredit visited on it by skeptical judges, who had been 
conditioned, and who in turn have conditioned us, to disregard the de 
monstrably less reliable, unaided truth-discerning powers of jurors.122 
116. Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
117. See Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
871, 881 (1992) (highlighting possibility that "the standard for determining relevancy" is 
"nowhere stated in the [Federal Rules of Evidence]"). 
118. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in 
Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 307 8c n.156 (1996) (quoting People v. Logan, 164 P. 
1121, 1122 (Cal. 1917)); see also id. at 307-10, 355-57 (describing importance of judicial 
"insist[enee] on adequate provocation" as "the infirmity of passion to which even good men 
are subject" (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
119. See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of 
Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 Va. L. 
Rev. 1723 (2001) (tracing history of handwriting expert evidence and discussing its 
inconsistent methodology). 
120. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the 
Power of Analogy, 10 YaleJ.L. 8c Human. 1, 14-33 (1998) (describing divergent attitudes 
toward accuracy of photography as evidence). 
121. See generally Neal Feigenson 8c Christina Spiesel, Law On Display: The Digital 
Transformation of Legal Persuasion and Judgment (2009) (discussing influence of visual 
images on trial outcomes). 
122. See Kenworthey Bilz, Self-Incrimination Doctrine Is Dead; Long Live Self 
Incrimination Doctrine: Confessions, Scientific Evidence, and the Anxieties of the Liberal 
State, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 807, 863-66 (2008) (discussing distrust of lie detector tests as 
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Fingerprint analysis remains impervious to discredit precisely because the 
longtime acceptance of it by credulous judges has made legislators and 
members of the public incredulous when confronted with scientific proof 
that it lacks validity.123 
The primary mission of the academic study of evidence should be to 
preempt the self-reinforcing propagation of false empirical generaliza 
tions and scientifically deficient modes of factfinding.124 To justify as a 
moral matter the status scholars enjoy and the influence they wield (mea 
ger as those might be, they are amply large enough to make what aca 
demics do genuinely consequential), they must be willing to adopt a criti 
cal posture toward the mechanisms by which the judicial system certifies 
social truth, even though doing so will inevitably put their status and in 
fluence at risk. The style of L&E theorizing that tries to buy credibility for 
itself by exploiting our disposition to believe that the real is rational, and 
the rational real, deepens the pathologies that afflict our law as a result of 
this very disposition. 
This is not the only style of L&E scholarship. Indeed, the most ac 
claimed L&E commentary today consists of a mix of original and 
pragmatically applied empirical work, which is just as likely to criticize 
and propose reforming existing doctrine as to rationalize it.125 There are 
some very important examples of economic analyses of evidence that con 
form to this model.126 
Indeed, the best reason for the academic study to resist the half-posi 
tive, half-normative rationalizing historically characteristic of the eco 
nomic analysis of law is precisely its power to divert evidence scholars 
reliable evidence); Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural 
Bias Against "Mind Reading" Devices, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 1351, 1354 (2007) ("[E]ven the 
most accurate of polygraph techniques (which are more accurate than many forms of 
admissible expert evidence) have been routinely rejected." (footnote omitted)). 
123. See, e.g., Ari Shapiro, Congress Weighs in on Forensic Study, Nat'l Pub. Radio 
(Sept. 9, 2009), at http://www.scpr.org/news/2009/09/09/congress-weighs-forensics 
study/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting Senator Jeff Sessions's critical 
response to conclusion of National Academy of Sciences report that fingerprint 
identification methods lack validity and reliability: "I don't think we should suggest that 
those proven scientific principles that we've been using for decades are somehow 
uncertain"). 
124. See Nat'l Research Council of the Nat'l Acads., supra note 13, at 86 ("[E]very 
effort must be made to limit the risk of having the reliability of certain forensic science 
methodologies judicially certified before the techniques have been properly studied and 
their accuracy verified."). 
125. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Judicial Decisionmaking and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. 111. L. Rev. 819, 
843-49 (discussing emergence of empiricism as positive movement in study of law and 
"singing the praises of empirical legal scholarship"). 
126. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 84, at 583-86 ("Complex decisions are solved ... by 
nuanced cognitive processes that progress bidirectionally between premises and facts on 
the one hand, and conclusions on the other."); Wistrich et al., Deliberately Disregarding, 
supra note 85, at 1323 (discussing empirical research indicating judges' inability to 
disregard inadmissible information in determining guilt). 
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from exploiting the power of a superior form of L&E. L&E theories in 
formed by psychological and experimental methods, in particular, supply 
indispensible tools for discovering and remedying the myriad deficiencies 
in evidence law. 
It is no coincidence, in my view, that the very first systematic applica 
tion of economic thinking to common law evidence doctrines?that of 
Jeremy Bentham?was acidly hostile to them.127 Bentham saw his icono 
clastic utilitarian brand of economics as the cure for the potential of con 
ventional modes of thinking to infect adjudication with error, and ulti 
mately with injustice.128 We should not stand for the adulteration of his 
antidote?searching criticism fueled by genuinely skeptical consequen 
tialist thinking?with the palliative that is economic storytelling. 
127. See generally 4 Bentham, supra note 3 (describing aversion to English common 
law and evidentiary rules). 
128. See generally William L. Twining, Theories of Evidence: Ben tham and Wigmore 
(1985) (discussing Bentham's views on evidence law and calls for its reform). 
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